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Abstract 
Background: False memories are memories of events that never occurred or that occurred, but not exactly as we recall. Events with emotional content are 
subject to false memories production similar to neutral events. However, individual differences, such as the level of maladjustment and emotional instability 
characteristics of Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD), may interfere in the production of false memories. Objectives: This study aimed to assess the effect of 
emotion in memory performance for an event witnessed by participants with and without SAD. Methods: Participants were 61 young adults with SAD and 
76 without any symptoms of SAD who were randomly assigned to watch a story with or without emotional arousal. Participants answered a subjective scale 
of emotion about the story and a recognition memory test. Results: Participants with SAD recovered more true memories and more false memories for the non-
emotional version compared to the emotional version of the story. Overall, participants with SAD produced fewer false memories compared to those without SAD. 
Discussion: This finding suggests that social anxiety may have a significant impact on emotional memory accuracy, which may assist in the development and 
improvement of techniques for therapeutic intervention.
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Introduction 
False memories, also referred to as distortions or illusions of 
memory, are memories of events that actually did not occur exactly 
as we remember1. This fact of recalling events that never occurred 
motivated several studies in the search for a greater understanding of 
these processes. It was observed that the level of emotional instability 
and mismatch significantly interferes in a greater number of false 
memories2,3, which are present in anxiety disorders. 
Among the anxiety disorders, Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) 
stands out, consisting of a marked and persistent fear of social or 
performance situations in which the individual might feel ashamed, 
being afraid of taking action where he/she may be humiliated and 
embarrassed. The social exposure or performance provokes a 
response of anxiety interfering significantly in the individual’s life4,5. 
It is estimated that the 12-month prevalence of SAD is 6.8% for the 
adult population6, one of the most common psychiatric disorders 
with a lifetime prevalence of 12%7. 
It is known that in anxiogenic situations, perceptions of high 
probability of failure in performance are activated, which trigger 
cognitive, behavioral, and somatic symptoms causing a shift of 
attention from the environment to the individuals themselves, 
who remain in constant monitoring of their behavior, feelings, and 
physical sensations of anxiety8. This process is known as selective 
attention bias; anxious individuals initially direct their attention to a 
threat (e.g., emotional arousal with negative content), but then tend 
to shift attention in order to relieve sensations of anxiety, resulting 
in memory selectivity9,10. 
Moreover, individuals with SAD tend to doubt their memories, 
interpreting ambiguous memories of social events in a less positive 
(or more negative) way compared to those without SAD11. One 
of the reasons that may compromise reliability of an individual’s 
memory is the belief that other people have a better memory12. One 
study found that less confident people (as in the case of individuals 
with SAD) accept the way the situation is recalled by another person 
(i.e., they acquiesce)2, which can lead to increased vulnerability to 
mnemonic distortions13.
SAD seems to be directly related to the fear of being rejected in 
social situations14. Individuals with a chronic level of maladjustment 
and emotional instability, notably insecure and inadequate, seem to 
be more easily swayed and susceptible to mnemonic distortions, such 
as false memories15,16. Recent studies have shown that individuals 
with psychosocial maladjustment produce more false memories3. 
Similarly, a desire for social interaction has been identified as a 
predictor of false memory for lists of semantically related words17. 
Despite these data, the literature still needs more research in clinical 
populations of individuals with anxiety disorders in general and with 
SAD, in particular. 
Thus, the present study aims to investigate the performance of 
memory for events with and without emotional arousal, in a clinical 
sample of individuals with SAD. To do so, we used visual and audio 
material18,19, as these conditions are highly more likely to stimulate 
emotional arousal in this population8. The main hypothesis to be 
tested presumes that individuals with SAD are more prone to false 
memories compared to healthy subjects. Furthermore, it is known 
that the levels of false memories seem to be influenced by the presence 
of emotion, which will be assessed systematically in this study20,21.
Methods
Design
The present study involved a 2 x 2 x 3 x 3 full factorial, mixed 
design, with repeated measures for the final two variables. The first 
variable was clinical characteristic of the population, in which some 
participants presented SAD and others had no clinical characteristic 
of anxiety. The second between subjects variable was the emotional 
arousal of the story, in which half the participants were exposed to 
a story with emotional arousal and the other half to a story without 
emotional arousal. Participants with and without SAD were randomly 
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assigned to watch either version of the story. Both versions of the 
story were divided into three phases (phase 2 is where the versions 
of the story differed in terms of arousal) and into three types on the 
memory test (target, related distractor, and unrelated distractor). The 
dependent variables were the assessment target of the emotionality of 
the story (i.e., arousal), which was measured from the subjective scale 
of emotion, and memory performance for the story’s information 
in a recognition test. 
Participants 
Participants were 164 college students from Ribeirão Preto, São Paulo, 
Brazil who were diagnosed as part of a larger study on the prevalence 
of SAD22. All 2,319 students were contacted and invited to complete 
memory portion of the study. 
Inclusion criteria for SAD sample were obtaining scores greater 
than or equal to 19 points in the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN)22,23 
and scores greater than or equal to 20 points in the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI)24, which indicate the presence of symptoms 
compatible with the diagnosis of SAD. The probable SAD individuals 
were evaluated by means of a version of the anxiety module of 
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV – Clinical Version 
(SCID-CV) translated and adapted to Portuguese25, for diagnostic 
confirmation. Furthermore, additional inclusion criteria for both 
SAD and non-SAD samples included no significant symptoms 
of depression based on scores of 6 or less and 10 or less in the 
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9)26 and the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI)24, respectively; good quality of life and well-being 
based on scores equal to or lower than 7 points on the Self-Reported 
Questionnaire (SRQ-20)27.
The final sample included 137 participants, 61 participants with 
SAD and 76 participants without symptoms of SAD. Among the 
participants with SAD, 98% did not use medication, 12% were in 
psychotherapy, no participant received a diagnosis of social phobia, 
8% had a history of psychiatric disorder, and 18%, a history of 
psychiatric disorder in the family. Among the participants without 
SAD, 20% reported they had had some psychiatric symptom, however 
no one presented social phobia or was on medication, and 22% had a 
family history of psychiatric disorder. In addition, 6% of participants 
with SAD and 4% without SAD indicated that they were smokers 
or used drugs. 
Participants were aged 17-34 years (M = 22.33; SD = 3.78), and 
64% were female. Among the participants with SAD, 34 watched 
the emotional side of the story (mean age = 22.53, SD = 3.69), being 
65% female. The number of participants with SAD who watched 
the non-emotional side of the story was 27 (mean age = 21.70, 
SD = 3.97), being 67% female. Among the participants without SAD, 
44 watched the emotional version of the story (mean age = 23.32, SD 
= 4.12), and 64% were female. The number of participants without 
SAD who watched the non-emotional version was 32 (mean age = 
21.28, SD = 2.92), being 59% female.
Instruments
The memory of the participants was assessed through a slideshow 
procedure19, which was translated and adapted to Brazilian reality 
and to the investigation of false memories18, with methodological 
improvements28 for the memory test. The story consisted of 11 slides 
followed by a narrative divided into three phases. In phase 1 (slides 
1-4), a mother and her son are on the way to the hospital where the 
father works; in phase 2 (slides 5-8), boy suffers an accident and goes 
to the hospital (arousal version) or the boy sees a crashed car and 
hospital procedures (non-arousal version); in phase 3 (slides 9-11), 
the mother goes away and calls home. Both versions had negative 
emotional content controlled for experimental purposes. 
The emotional arousal of the story was assessed by a subjective 
5-point Likert scale, ranging from “not emotional at all” (0) to 
“extremely emotional” (4).
Memory was tested by a self-administered memory recognition 
test composed of 84 yes-no items28. Participants were instructed to 
mark “yes” whenever the phrase corresponded to what was presented 
in the target material and “no” to all options that were not seen in the 
target material, even if it were information that could not be inferred 
about the event. The items of the test belonged to three categories: 
(i) target (equivalent to the measure of true memories); (ii) related 
distractor (equivalent to the measure of false memories); and (iii) 
unrelated distractor (equivalent to unrelated answers from error or 
“guess”). The items were distributed proportionally in relation to the 
three phases of the original material. 
Procedure
The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee on Human 
Rights of the College of Philosophy, Sciences, and Letters of Ribeirão 
Preto – São Paulo University (USP) (N. CEP-FFCLRP nº 534/2010). 
All participants signed an informed consent form, prepared 
according to the ethical guidelines for research with human beings. 
The memory material was presented with the use of multimedia 
equipment, and data collection was performed in groups in a silent 
room. Participants were advised to pay attention to the story, and 
to avoid comments throughout the procedure. Immediately after, 
subjects answered the subjective scale of emotion. Participants were 
instructed to be as honest as possible and to select the option that 
represents what they have really felt in terms of the arousal attributed 
to the emotion stimulated by the story. Before answering the memory 
recognition test, participants participated in a buffer activity. The 
buffer activity aimed to prevent the participant from retaining the 
online information. 
Data were analyzed using SPSS Statistics, version 20. To analyze 
the data obtained from these instruments, we used Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) with Bonferroni correction for post hoc analysis. 
All statistical treatments used a a < 0.05 for hypothesis testing.
Results and discussion
An univariate ANOVA was conducted to test differences of emotional 
arousal between the versions of the story and presence of SAD. 
Results indicated a main effect of the version [F(1.133) = 36.31, 
p < 0.001], demonstrating that the emotional version stimulates 
more arousal (M = 1.81; SD = 1.14) than the non-emotional version 
(M = 0.80, SD = 0.72), which is consistent with previous studies18,28,29. 
In addition, we observed an effect of the presence of SAD [F(1.133) = 
5.52, p < 0.05], which was responsible for a more intense evaluation 
of the effect of the stories’ emotional arousal (M = 1.58, SD = 1.06) in 
comparison to the participants without SAD (M = 1.22, SD = 1.11), 
which is consistent with typical aspects of this disorder, in which 
individuals often become hypervigilant regarding their physiological 
alterations and their bodily sensations, which seems to interfere in 
how participants with SAD rated the material30.
One hypothesis for this finding is that individuals with SAD 
believe that their appearance will accurately reflect all their 
physiological reactions of anxiety, which can be subject to scrutiny11, 
causing these individuals to utilize a protective measure, ignoring 
the physiological reactions experienced or by camouflaging them. 
Furthermore, one presumes that individuals with SAD get used to 
living with anxiety, so they somehow adapt to the physical reactions 
caused in situations that generate anxiety. As a result, subjects with 
SAD may have had difficulty in recognizing the emotions generated 
by the narrative. 
Overall effects of memory performance were analyzed by 
means of an ANOVA with repeated measures for the presence of 
SAD and the version of the story for each item type. The rates of 
non-mnemonic responses (or guesses) were very low and there 
was no difference between the groups (ps > 0.001), suggesting that 
participants were paying attention to the task.
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Regarding true memory, results showed higher rates for 
participants who watched the non-emotional version (M = 0.75, SD 
= 0.10) when compared to those who watched the emotional version 
of the story (M = 0.70, SD = 0.13) [F(1.133) = 6.10, p < 0,05]. Result 
were qualified by an interaction trend between presence of SAD and 
version of the story [F(1,133) = 2.97, p = 0,09]. Participants with SAD 
recovered more true memories for the non-emotional version (M = 0.76, 
SD = 0.09) than for the emotional version of the story (M = 0.68, SD 
= 0.13, p < 0,05). Given the typical processing of people with high 
levels of anxiety, it is possible to hypothesize that anticipatory anxiety 
prevailed over attentional processes30, causing individuals with SAD 
to remain more vigilant about the information of the video. This may 
have led to the lower rate of true memories for the emotional version.
With respect to false memories, there was a trend towards 
interaction between the presence of SAD and version of the story 
[F(1.133) = 3.76, p = 0.06], demonstrating increased production of 
false memories between the participants with SAD who watched 
the non-emotional version (M = 0.39, SD = 0.13) in comparison to 
those who watched the emotional version of the story (M = 0.31, 
SD = 0.15; p < 0.05). Among the participants who watched the non-
emotional version, there was a trend toward greater production of 
false memories in participants with SAD in comparison to those 
without SAD (M = 0.32, SD = 0.12; p = 0.08).
These results suggest that memory from participants with SAD is 
affected by emotional nature of the story, which, in addition to their 
poor social skills (responsible for high levels of maladjustment and 
emotional instability) and attentional biases, made them vulnerable to 
selective memory performance. Overall, individuals with SAD exhibit 
impaired activation in the associative, interpretative, and attentional 
processes potentially leading to an attentional bias31,32, especially for 
stimuli perceived as dangerous or threatening33,34.
Anxiety disorders result in distortions in information processing, 
leading to perceptual sensitivity and memory bias34-36. This result 
seems to be in line with the findings of the study that proposes 
that individuals with SAD accept more outside influences when 
the situation is devoid of arousal, believing that the source of the 
material is more reliable than their own memory, and they reject 
more information of the memory test in general (both true and false)2. 
An analysis of the results between the phases of the story was 
performed to isolate the effect of the arousal in the second phase of the 
story when arousal information was presented only in the emotional 
version. An ANOVA with repeated measures was performed for 
the presence of SAD and version of the story for each type of item 
(Table 1).
There was a main effect of phase for true memory [F(2.132) = 
91.53, p < 0.001], indicating an increase in true memories in phase 2 in 
comparison to phase 3 (p < 0.001). This result was qualified by an 
interaction trend between the presence of SAD, version of the story, 
and phase [F(2.132) = 2.47, p = 0.09], in which we observed an increase 
in true memory in phase 2 compared to phase 3 under all conditions 
(p < 0.05 for all cases). The effect of emotion from phase 2 was also 
observed in an interaction with presence of SAD, given that participants 
without SAD recovered more accurate information than participants with 
SAD (p < 0.05). Among participants with SAD, there was an increase in 
true memories for phase 2 for the non-emotional version of the story 
compared to the emotional version (p < 0.05).
With respect to false memories, there was a main effect of phase 
[F(2,132) = 116,17, p < 0.001]. The results showed that fewer 
false memories are produced in phase 2 than in phases 1 and 3 
(ps < 0.001) and in phase 1 than in phase 3 (p < 0.05). In contrast, 
we observed an effect of phase on the production of non-mnemonic 
responses [F(2.132) = 3.69, p < 0.05], with lower indices for phase 2 
than phase 1, although all indices were low in general. In this sense, 
the vulnerability of memory does not seem to be associated with 
emotional arousal for individuals with SAD. Therefore, the emotional 
arousal seems to be protective of memory in subjects with SAD, in 
line with the idea that anxious people effectively recall information 
related to risk34.
Finally, we can conclude that individuals with SAD present 
mnemonic changes. The results of this study help to further 
understand the attentional and mnemonic processes in individuals 
with SAD, and may assist in the development and improvement 
of techniques for therapeutic intervention. However, longitudinal 
studies, assessing memory performance before and after different 
treatment modalities (CBT, pharmacotherapy) and studies 
comparing SAD individuals to individuals with other anxiety 
disorders are deemed necessary and appropriate.
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Table 1. Mean of recognition (and standard deviation) by version of the story, type of item, and phase for participants with and without social anxiety disorder
Version of the story
Phase Item Type Emotional Non-emotional Total
With SAD Without SAD With SAD Without SAD
1 TM 0.72 (0.16) 0.78 (0.12) 0.83 (0.11) 0.77 (0.14) 0.77 (0.14)
FM 0.33 (0.15) 0.37 (0.18) 0.43 (0.16) 0.36 (0.15) 0.37 (0.16)
UA 0.05 (0.12) 0.02 (0.06) 0.05 (0.16) 0.03 (0.08) 0.03 (0.11)
2 TM 0.70 (0.16) 0.77 (0.16) 0.82 (0.12) 0.80 (0.13) 0.77 (0.15)
FM 0.19 (0.15) 0.21 (0.13) 0.24 (0.13) 0.21 (0.16) 0.21 (0.14)
UA 0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.05) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05)
3 TM 0.62 (0.17) 0.61 (0.16) 0.65 (0.12) 0.64 (0.14) 0.63 (0.15)
FM 0.42 (0.22) 0.44 (0.23) 0.50 (0.20) 0.41 (0.21) 0.44 (0.22)
UA 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.05 (0.12) 0.02 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07)
SAD: social anxiety disorder; TM: true memory; FM: false memories; UA: unrelated answers.
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